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Air travel has increased over the last few decades resulting in 
greater risk of the spread of infectious diseases carried by infectious 
travellers. The risk of transmission of pathogens is particularly 
important for airborne organisms raising concern among public 
health agencies and the public. Despite limited research on the 
risk of tuberculosis associated with air travel, several reports have 
published evidence of the transmission of tuberculosis infection, 
including multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) [1, 2]. 
Recent developments, including the revision of International 
Health Regulations (IHR) [3], the emergence of extensively drug-
resistant (XDR) TB [4,5] and more frequent reports of incidents 
involving air passengers with infectious tuberculosis  [6] have 
highlighted the need for updated international guidelines.
The WHO has published the third edition of its guidelines 
“Tuberculosis and air travel: Guidelines for prevention and 
control” (http://www.who.int/tb/publications/2008/WHO_HTM_
TB_2008.399_eng.pdf). It is intended that implementing the 
recommendations will help to reduce the international spread of 
TB and decrease the risk of infection among individual travellers. 
These evidence based guidelines provide greater clarity in the 
definition of the infectiousness of index cases in the context of air 
travel. This is categorised as: infectious TB, potentially infectious 
and non- infectious TB, based on sputum-smear status and culture 
results, in order to allow a better description of control measures to 
be taken.  Further action is recommended for infectious TB cases, 
while for potentially infectious TB cases additional information (e.g. 
results of drug sensitivity tests) should be requested to conduct 
a risk assessment and determine whether a contact investigation 
should be considered. No further investigation is required for non-
infectious TB cases. For action at national level, national public 
health authorities may modify the definitions based on more specific 
criteria in accordance with their national guidelines.
The WHO developed the guidelines in collaboration with experts 
from the European Centre for Disease Control, several national 
public health authorities and international experts in the prevention 
and control of TB and travel medicine.
The roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the risk 
assessment and risk management are defined in more detail than 
in the previous editions published in 1998 and 2006 [7,8]. The 
guidelines also outline the procedures involved in the follow-up of 
contacts of infectious cases and allow greater flexibility for national 
and local public bodies to follow national recommendations. The 
full recommendations are outlined in Box 1.
The guidelines also acknowledge several areas where the 
evidence base is poor and recommend further research to improve 
our understanding of transmission of tuberculosis during air travel 
and the effectiveness of contact investigation in this setting.  
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Specific recommendations on the third edition of the air travel guidelines
For travellers
Pre-travel
•	 People	with	infectious	or	potentially	infectious	TB	should	postpone	all	travel	by	commercial	air	transportation*	of	any	flight	duration	until	they	become	non-
infectious.
For physicians
Pre-travel
•	 Physicians	should	inform	all	infectious	and	potentially	infectious	TB	patients	that	they	must	not	travel	by	air	on	any	commercial	flight	of	any	duration	until	
they have completed at least 2 weeks of adequate treatment and they are sputum smear negative on at least two occasions (additional steps are required for 
MDR-TB and XDR-TB, see next recommendation). 
•	 Physicians	should	inform	all	MDR-TB	and	XDR-TB	patients	that	they	must	not	travel	by	any	commercial	flight	–	under	any	circumstances	or	on	a	flight	of	any	
duration – until they are proven to be non-infectious (i.e. two consecutive negative sputum-culture results).
•	 Physicians	should	immediately	inform	the	relevant	public	health	authority	when	they	are	aware	that	an	infectious	or	potentially	infectious	TB	patient	intends	
to travel against medical advice.
•	 Physicians	should	immediately	inform	the	public	health	authority	when	they	are	aware	that	an	infectious	or	potentially	infectious	TB	patient	may	have	
exceptional circumstances requiring commercial air travel.
Post-travel
•	 Physicians	should	immediately	inform	the	public	health	authority	when	an	infectious	or	potentially	infectious	TB	patient	has	a	history	of	commercial	air	
travel within the previous 3 months.
For public health authorities (see also requirements under IHR)
Pre-travel
•	 Public	health	authorities	who	are	aware	that	a	person	with	infectious	TB	is	planning	to	travel	via	a	commercial	air	carrier	should	inform	the	concerned	
airline and request that boarding be denied. 
•	 If	an	infectious	or	potentially	infectious	TB	patient	has	exceptional	circumstances	that	may	require	commercial	air	travel,	public	health	authorities	should	
ensure that the airline(s) involved and the national public health authorities at departure, arrival and any transit points have approved the commercial air 
travel and the procedures for travel.
Post-travel
•	 The	public	health	authority)	should	promptly	contact	the	airline	when	an	infectious	or	potentially	infectious	TB	patient	is	known	to	have	travelled	on	a	
commercial flight that may have been of 8 hours duration or longer within the preceding 3 months in order to obtain the information required for the initial 
risk assessment (i.e. confirm that the passenger was on the flight and the total flight duration).
•	 The	public	health	authority	of	the	country	of	diagnosis	should	carry	out	a	risk	assessment	based	on	the	specific	conditions	of	the	case.	If	the	index	case	
is considered to be infectious or potentially infectious, the public health authorities of all countries involved should be informed (i.e. countries where the 
flight(s) departed and landed). 
•	 If	a	contact	investigation	involves	more	than	one	country,	national	public	health	authorities	of	the	involved	countries	should	agree	on	their	respective	roles	
and responsibilities (including who will request the passenger manifests from airlines). International bodies such as WHO, the EC, ECDC, or others may provide 
assistance if requested. 
•	 The	national	public	health	authority	that	obtained	the	passenger	information	from	the	airline	should	contact	counterpart	public	health	authorities	in	the	
appropriate countries and provide them with the relevant information on the source case and the available contact information of all travellers identified as 
potentially exposed (i.e. those passengers seated in the same row and in the two rows in front of and behind the index case) in their jurisdiction. 
•	 Public	health	authorities	may	follow	national	policies	and	guidelines	regarding	TB	contact	investigation	involving	potentially	exposed	travellers	in	their	
jurisdiction, in accordance with requirements under the IHR (see also Annex 3 of the guidelines).
•	 Public	health	authorities	should	be	in	communication	with	their	National	IHR	Focal	Point	concerning	any	event	that	may	involve	the	IHR,	including	events	
for which international contact tracing may be initiated, for assessment of any action that may be required under the IHR and support in facilitating 
communication.
•	 National	and	international	public	health	authorities	are	encouraged	to	collaborate	on	research	concerning	TB	and	air	travel.
For airline companies
Pre-travel
•	 Airline	companies	should	deny	boarding	to	any	person	who	is	known	to	have	infectious	or	potentially	infectious	TB	as	informed	by	the	relevant	public	health	
authority. 
•	 Airline	companies	should,	in	the	case	of	ground	delays	that	last	for	30	minutes	or	longer	with	passengers	on	board,	ensure	that	the	ventilation	system	is	in	
operation. 
•	 Airline	companies	should	ensure	that	all	their	aircraft	which	recirculate	the	cabin	air	are	fitted	with	a	filtration	system.	New	aircraft	should	be	fitted	
with 99.97% efficiency HEPA filters, or an alternative of at least this level of efficiency. The filtration system should be maintained in accordance with the 
recommendations of the filter manufacturer. 
•	 Airline	companies	should	ensure	that	cabin	crews	receive	adequate	training	on	potential	exposure	to	communicable	diseases,	in	first	aid,	and	in	applying	
universal precautions when there may be exposure to body fluids. 
•	 Airline	companies	should	ensure	that	there	are	adequate	emergency	medical	supplies	aboard	all	aircraft	(including	gloves,	surgical	masks,	biohazard	disposal	
bags and disinfectant).
Post-travel
•	 Airline	companies	should	cooperate	with	national	public	health	authorities	in	providing	as	quickly	as	possible	all	available	contact	information	requested	for	
contact-tracing of travellers, in accordance with applicable legal requirements including the IHR.
*	excluding	specially	designated	aircraft	-	air	ambulance
